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RETHINKING CONSTITUTIONALITY IN
EDUCATION RIGHTS CASES
Joshua E. Weishart

ABSTRACT
Education rights cases often devolve into a farce of
constitutional brinkmanship played by a miserable cast of
reluctant courts and recalcitrant legislatures. Between successive
rounds of litigation and tepid legislative fixes, come threats of
impeaching judges, closing schools, stripping courts of
jurisdiction, and holding legislators in contempt. Despite all the
bluster, judges and legislators both anxiously await the curtain
call, when they can bow out and terminate the matter. In the end,
what passes for constitutionality in the successful cases is a
school funding scheme judged “reasonably likely” or
“reasonably calculated” to achieve an adequate or equitable
education—as opposed to a public education system that is
adequate and equitable. But rather than reflect the reality that
adequacy and equity are interminable demands, these cases
reflect a failure to confront and blunt that reality for
disadvantaged children.
The trouble lies in a judicial exit strategy focused on a
fixed point of compliance—a state of being constitutional—that
is altogether misplaced and counterproductive when the object is
educational adequacy and equity. This Article proposes that the
focus instead should be on whether the state maintains fidelity
with those guarantees. That reconception counsels courts to
entertain periodic exercises of jurisdiction. Between these
periodic exercises of jurisdiction, interim remedies—data
collection and public engagement projects—should gauge and
sustain the state’s fidelity with the constitutional guarantees.

Professor of Law and Policy, College of Law and John D. Rockefeller IV School of
Policy and Politics, West Virginia University. My thanks to the editors for the invitation to
publish this Article for the 2018 Arkansas Law Review Symposium, “Hiding in Plain Sight:
What Education Reform Needs.”
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More fundamentally, this reconception requires transformative
thinking, beginning with an acknowledgment that the end goal
in these cases should be progress towards a goal without end.

I. INTRODUCTION
“It feels weird to say it’s done, after all this time,” said
Stephanie McCleary, mother of two, who challenged the
constitutionality of Washington’s K-12 school funding system. 1
When Stephanie and her husband initiated the lawsuit in 2007,
their son Carter was seven and their daughter Kelsey was
thirteen; when the court finally terminated the case in 2018,
Kelsey had already graduated from college and Carter had
graduated from high school.2 It felt somewhat like a hollow
victory, not just for her family, leaving Stephanie to wonder,
“What does ‘done’ mean?”3
For even as the court terminated the case, Stephanie and
her attorney insisted it “didn’t rule on whether the state’s plan
actually fulfills the constitutional definition of ‘ample’
funding.”4 The definition of ample funding and its alleged
denial to a million-plus K-12 children was the basis of the
McClearys’ original petition.5 Decades earlier, the Washington
Supreme Court had declared that ample funding was the State’s
“mandatory,” “affirmative,” and “paramount” duty. 6 Decades
later, when McCleary reached the high court, it reiterated that
ample meant “fully sufficient” funding, enough to guarantee to
“each and every child” a “constitutionally adequate education”
that provides “the opportunity” to meet the State’s education
standards.7 This paramount duty is “the State’s first and highest
priority before any other State programs or operations.”8

1. . Joseph O’Sullivan, Washington Supreme Court Ends Long-running McCleary
Education Case Against the State, SEATTLE TIMES (June 9, 2018),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/washington-supreme-court-ends-100000-perday-sanctions-against-state-in-mccleary-education-case/ [https://perma.cc/L924-DPRZ].
2. . Id.
3. . Id.
4. . Id.
5. . See McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 244–45 (Wash. 2012).
6. . See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 85 (Wash. 1978).
7. . See McCleary, 269 P.3d at 249, 251–53.
8. . Id. at 249.
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The court unanimously agreed with the McClearys that the
state had failed to fulfill that duty. 9 The school funding
formulas were not calibrated to meet the actual costs of
providing an adequate education, resulting in the underfunding
of teacher salaries, transportation, instructional materials, and
other operating costs.10 The State had instead “relied heavily on
local levies to fill the gap in funding,” especially for teacher
salaries.11
Local districts were thereby forced “to turn
increasingly to excess levies”—property rich districts were able
to do so, property poor districts could not—”thus affecting the
equity of a statewide system.” 12 Therefore, the court concluded,
the State must undertake “fundamental reforms” to address these
issues and satisfy “its constitutional obligation to its students.”13
That conclusion, rendered in 2012, came too late for Kelsey
McCleary, by then a high school senior, who would not benefit
from any funding reforms. 14 Younger brother Carter, then in
middle school, would also not benefit from those reforms, which
did not come for another six years, until 2018. You see, rather
than order specific reforms in its 2012 decision, the court
deferred to the Legislature to devise the appropriate K-12
funding system remedies.15
A majority of the court,
nevertheless, elected to retain jurisdiction to monitor
implementation.16 “This option,” the majority said, “strikes the
appropriate balance between deferring to the legislature to
determine the precise means for discharging its [constitutional]
duty, while also recognizing this court’s constitutional
obligation” to ensure compliance.17 The court also required the
Legislature to submit periodic reports on its progress. 18
9. . See id. at 261.
10. . See id. at 253–58.
11. . Id. at 257.
12. . McCleary, 269 P.3d at 252-53.
13. . See id. at 258.
14. . See Donna Gordon Blankinship, What the Education-funding Lawsuit Means to
Moms, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 12, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7NRT-RMCQ].
15. . See McCleary, 269 P.3d at 260–61.
16. . Id. at 261.
17. . Id.
18. . McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, at 2 (Wash. Jul. 18, 2012) (order requiring the
legislature to submit periodic reports) [https://perma.cc/SHT5-JYCR].
Order from Jul. 18, 2012 at 2, McCleary, 269 P.3d 227 (No. 84362-7)
[https://perma.cc/SHT5-JYCR].
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In the six years that followed, “legislators and the governor
dragged their heels,” failing to comply fully with the 2012
decision.19 Just two years in, the court unanimously held the
State in contempt for failing to submit a plan for full
implementation of the required reforms. 20 A year later, the
Legislature remained obstinate, so the court took the
unprecedented step of imposing a $100,000-per-day fine until
the State complied. 21 Meanwhile, three Supreme Court justices
faced challenges in the 2016 election, their challengers recruited
by a state representative who viewed McCleary as a judicial
overreach. 22 Not to be outdone, the McClearys’ attorney
suggested that the court should ratchet up the contempt
sanctions, threaten to shut down schools or invalidate billions in
previously enacted corporate tax breaks, unless or until the state
complied. 23
The brinkmanship eventually gave way to action and cooler
heads prevailed. The three incumbent justices won reelection,
the court did not impose more drastic contempt sanctions, and,
in 2017, the Legislature enacted a K-12 budget under new
formulas that the court then determined would fund the
components of a basic education and “achieve constitutional
compliance” when “fully implemented.”24 The only matter
delaying full implementation at that point was when the
Legislature would be required to fund increases in teacher and
staff salaries to bring compensation to market levels. 25 The
State wanted until the 2019-20 school year to phase in the full
$2.2 billion salary increase, but the court insisted on full
19. . O’Sullivan, supra note 1.
20. . McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, at 4 (Wash. Sept. 11, 2014) (order finding the
State in contempt for failing to comply with a previous order) [https://perma.cc/DP5CGXRU].
21. . McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, at 9-10 (Wash. Aug. 13, 2015) (order assessing
a $100,000 per day penalty on the State of Washington) [https://perma.cc/4CVC-XXZE].
22. . Sara Hayden, Electing the Bench: An Analysis of the Possible Negative Effects
of Judicial Elections on Hawai’i’s Legal Community, 18 ASIAN -P AC. L. & P OL’Y J. 114,
134 (2016).
23. . Melissa Santos, Why $67 Million Fine Isn’t Motivating the Legislature to Act,
THE NEWS TRIBUNE (Jun. 13, 2017) [https://perma.cc/3NDY-49AP].
24. . McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, at 1 (Wash. Nov. 15, 2017) (order
acknowledging the State of Washington’s progress in the McCleary matter)
[https://perma.cc/WW7A-SZUB].
25. . Id. at 2.
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implementation by its September 1, 2018 deadline. 26
Lawmakers relented, appropriating the full funds for the new
salary allocation model by the start of the 2018-19 school year.27
That brought the State into compliance with the court’s prior
orders in the case—even the McClearys agreed—and “therefore
the State’s appeal” could at last “come to an end.”28 More than
a decade after the case was initiated, the court lifted its contempt
sanctions and terminated its jurisdiction. 29
By nearly every traditional measure, the McClearys had
prevailed. The court reaffirmed and elaborated on children’s
“positive constitutional right” to education, explaining that it (i)
imposes a duty compelling, rather than restraining, government
action to provide an adequate education and (ii) obligates “the
court to take a more active stance in ensuring that the State
complies with its affirmative constitutional duty.”30 And the
court remained steadfast in its demands that the State fulfill its
paramount duty despite staunch opposition and noncompliance
from the other coordinate branches of government. The court
did not flinch in imposing contempt sanctions that the State was
forced to set aside in a separate account—$105 million of which
the State appropriated for teacher salaries and special education
costs.31
In total, lawmakers increased state funding for K-12
education by more than $8 billion. 32 That additional funding
will help pay for all-day kindergarten, reduced K-3 class sizes,
enhanced transportation, increased funding for exceptional and
special needs students, and market-based salaries for teachers,
among other things. 33 Overall spending per pupil “increased
from $6,655 in 2010 to $9,344 in 2018.”34 As a result, “more

26. . Id. at 2, 41–42.
27. . McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, at 2–3 (Wash. June 7, 2018) (order lifting the
$100,000 per day penalty against the State of Washington) [https://perma.cc/3KVL-L4YS].
28. . Id. at 3–4.
29. . Id. at 4.
30. . McCleary, 269 P.3d at 247–48.
31. . Order of Jun. 7, 2018, supra note 27, at 3. The court declined plaintiffs’ request
to order the state “to pay prejudgment interest on the accrued sanctions.” Id. at 4.
32. . See Order of Nov. 15, 2017, supra note 24, at 23 (from $13.4 billion when
McCleary was decided in 2012 to $22 billion when it was terminated in 2018).
33. . See id. at 28–40.
34. . Id. at 23.
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than half of the state’s operating budget will go to public schools
for the first time in nearly 25 years.” 35
So why were Stephanie McCleary and her attorney
unwilling to accept this outcome as a complete and total victory?
Because they contended that the court did not determine that the
new funding formulas were, in fact, fully sufficient to guarantee
all children a constitutionally adequate education.36 Yet that
was the impression conveyed by the court putting its imprimatur
on the new formula, formally approving the state’s actions, and
terminating the case. 37 Before the court ended its jurisdiction,
there was already some evidence to suggest that the new school
finance scheme was not, in fact, adequately or equitably
funded.38 Indeed, within months of the court’s ruling, teachers
in multiple school districts went on strike when contract
negotiations failed over the $2 billion allocated for increased
teacher salaries.39 For some districts, the overriding sense was
35. . Jim Camden, Legislature Met Its Duty on Public Schools, Supreme Court Says,
THE
SPOKESMAN -REVIEW
(Jun.
8,
2018),
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2018/jun/07/legislature-met-its-duty-on-publicschools-supreme/ [https://perma.cc/W2YN-URR].
36. . Id.
37. . See, e.g., id.; They Did It! Washington Has Finally Fully Funded Education,
MYNORTHWEST (Jun. 7, 2018), http://mynorthwest.com/1012718/washington-fully-fundseducation-mccleary/ [https://perma.cc/V85J-ESP9]; Emily Boerger, Supreme Court Rules
Legislature Finally in Full Compliance with the McCleary Decision, WASHINGTON STATE
WIRE (Jun. 7, 2018), https://washingtonstatewire.com/supreme-court-rules-legislaturefinally-in-full-compliance-with-the-mccleary-decision/ [https://perma.cc/9DYH-SS42].
38. . See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Washington’s Paramount Duty, 1-8, McCleary, 269
P.3d 227 (No. 84362-7); Bill Keim, Commentary: School funding lawsuit over but not its
headaches,
THE
HEARLD
(Jun.
24,
2018),
https://www.heraldnet.com/opinion/commentary-school-funding-lawsuit-over-but-not-itsheadaches/ [https://perma.cc/ULF5-ZVES]; The Editorial Board, McCleary is over, but
work to improve education in Washington is not, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Jun. 7, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/Q5ZV-QXXL]; BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A
NATIONAL REPORT CARD 17, 26 (7th ed. 2018) [https://perma.cc/ZXB8-UP9C].
39. . See Sarah Schwartz, Washington State Teachers Strike Over Salary
Negotiations,
EDUCATION
WEEK
(Aug.
29,
2018),
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/teacherbeat/2018/08/washington_state_teachers_strike.htm
l [https://perma.cc/793Y-4DTR]; Melissa Hellman, Seattle Public Schools and Teachers’
Unions Spar Over Alleged Deficits, SEATTLE WEEKLY (Aug. 6, 2018),
http://www.seattleweekly.com/news/seattle-public-schools-and-teachers-unions-spar-ofalleged-deficits/ [https://perma.cc/39PY-QQ98]; Neal Morton, Washington State’s Teacher
Contract Chaos was Inevitable, YAKIMAHEARLD. COM (Sept. 1, 2018),
https://www.yakimaherald.com/news/education/analysis-washington-state-s-teachercontract-chaos-was-inevitable/article_f6449dca-ae6e-11e8-8df4-77aeebe6aad4.html
[https://perma.cc/SFY6-E8L4].
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that “the state gave with one hand and took with another” in
order to comply with McCleary. 40
The Washington Supreme Court accepted that there might
be funding disparities remaining after the State had achieved full
compliance its orders.41 But the court said it was “willing to
allow the State’s program to operate and let experience be the
judge of whether it proves adequate.”42 That was acceptable, the
court reasoned, because the standard it had adopted for
constitutionality was whether the State “acted within the broad
range of its policy discretion in a manner that ‘achieves or is
reasonably likely to achieve’ the constitutional end of amply
funding K-12 basic education.”43 And so, the State did not
actually need to achieve ample funding, provided it could show
that its funding formulas were at least reasonably likely to
achieve ample funding.
This ‘reasonably likely’ or ‘reasonably calculated’ to
achieve standard is fast becoming the benchmark for
constitutionality in education rights cases, particularly in the
latter remedial stages of adequacy suits. 44 Most state high courts
have abandoned heightened scrutiny and the tiers of scrutiny
altogether, even when the right to education has been deemed
fundamental under the state constitution. 45 A number of state
courts have increasingly turned instead to an ad-hoc, oftenunannounced, less proscriptive standard that scrutinizes the
reasonableness of the fit between the legislative means and the
constitutional ends (adequacy and equity), with little or no
scrutiny of the means or the ends themselves. 46 As I explain in
Part II, this reasonable fit standard is ill-suited to the task of
determining constitutionality in education rights cases because it
is predicated on a fixed point of compliance for educational
adequacy and equity—variable constitutional ends that cannot
40. . See Jim Allen, For school systems, McCleary Decision Gave with One Hand
and Took with the Other, THE SPOKESMAN -REVIEW (Sept. 9, 2018),
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2018/sep/09/for-school-systems-confusion-and-angstmix-with-re/ [https://perma.cc/B3XN-T7RK].
41. . See Order of Nov. 15, 2017, supra note 24, at 28–39.
42. . Id. at 37.
43. . Id. (quoting McCleary, 269 P.3d at 248).
44. . See Joshua E. Weishart, Equal Liberty in Proportion, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
215, 243–59 (2017).
45. . See id.
46. . See id. at 260–66.
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be so neatly circumscribed. I propose a new approach in Part
III, one geared towards sustaining demonstrable and durable
fidelity to those constitutional ends.

II. FIXED CONSTITUTIONALITY, ENDLESS
CONSTITUTIONAL ENDS
Courts achieve the pretense of reaching a fixed point of
constitutional compliance in education rights by applying an
unfixed, rather loose standard. As a measure of constitutionality,
the reasonable fit standard licenses considerable discretion and
latitude; its contours remain fluid, and deliberately so. All of
this elasticity increases the likelihood of inconsistent rulings
over time. Perhaps most problematic for a standard that was
developed partly to address justiciability concerns, it is “at once
more and less deferential to the legislature than state separation
of powers doctrine commands.” 47
It is less deferential whenever the legislative means are not
reasonably likely to achieve the constitutional ends of
educational adequacy and equity because then courts are
compelled to pass judgment on the legislative means—a
separation of powers boundary that courts have drawn for
themselves and have been unwilling to cross, at least directly. 48
It is more deferential whenever the case enters the remedial and
contempt phases because courts, by then weary from extended
showdowns with the legislature, have been inclined to find the
legislative means reasonably likely to achieve the constitutional
ends despite persistent educational deprivations and
disparities. 49 In such instances, the reasonable fit standard
permits the court to excuse objectionable deprivations and
disparities in the short term on the prospect that they might be
cured, without providing any mechanism for assuring sustained
progress in the long term.50

47. . Joshua E. Weishart, Aligning Education Rights and Remedies, 27 KAN. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 346, 382 (2018).
48. . See id.
49. . See id. at 382–83.
50. . See Weishart, supra note 44, at 289–90.
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For these and other reasons, I have elsewhere proposed a
new constitutional standard of review 51 as well as remedial
standards for evaluating legislative and judicial remedies 52—all
of which focus more on scrutinizing progress towards the
constitutional ends than on the reasonableness of their fit with
the legislative means.
Assuming that reasonable fit emerges as the prevailing
standard, however, it should be a test for conditional
compliance, not for constitutionality.
That is how the
“reasonably calculated” standard operates, for instance, in
special education cases. To comply with the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, the school district must offer an
individualized education plan “reasonably calculated to enable a
child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances.”53 The standard contemplates that the degree of
a child’s grade-to-grade progress along with changes to his or
her circumstances affect an IEP’s statutory compliance year to
year. 54 Likewise, the “reasonably calculated” standard for
determining “appropriate action” under the Equal Opportunity
Education Act for limited English proficient students is
conditioned on whether the school’s program “produce[s] results
indicating that the language barriers confronting students are
actually being overcome” after a “sufficient” time period.55
Misapplication of the reasonable fit standard as a test for
constitutionality rather than conditional compliance invites at
least three problems: (1) It distorts the norm and expectations of
constitutionality; (2) It indulges rather perverse presumptions
51. . See id. at 292 (proposing “direct-proportionality review [that] entails a two-part
inquiry. First, do the state’s actions advance children’s equality and liberty interests by
ensuring that vertical equity and adequacy maintain a mutually reinforcing, upward
trajectory? Second, is the margin between vertical equity and adequacy proportional so as
to protect children from the harms of educational disparities?”).
52. . See Weishart, supra note 47, at 353 (proposing “direct proportionality standard”
for “a court’s review of legislative remedies intended to cure violations of the state
constitutional right to education” and a “reasonable congruence standard” for “courts in
contemplating or reviewing injunctive relief to cure [such] violations”).
53. . Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999
(2017).
54. . Id. at 999 (“Progress through this system is what our society generally means by
an ‘education.’ False Accordingly,. . .an IEP typically should. . . be reasonably calculated
to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.”) (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
55. . See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1010 (5th Cir. 1981).
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and burdens in favor of repeated rights offenders; and (3) It
foments the misguided belief that constitutionality can be fixed
for educational adequacy and equity.

A. Constitutionality Distorted
The reasonable fit standard distorts both the norm and
expectations of constitutionality in education rights cases.
Constitutionality is commonly understood as the “quality, state,
or condition of being” in accordance with the constitution. 56
The Washington Supreme Court was decidedly not saying that
its K-12 system had an achieved such a quality, state, or
condition when it concluded that the new 2017-18 funding
formulas had satisfied the reasonable fit standard. According to
the court’s 2012 McCleary decision, full compliance with its
constitution will not be reached until the State has adequately
and equitably funded education such that “each and every child”
has an “opportunity” to obtain certain judicially-approved and
legislatively-enacted educational “outcomes.”57
The state
constitution does not mandate that every child actually achieve
those educational outcomes, just that they have a fair and
meaningful opportunity to achieve them. 58 But to judge whether
such opportunity exists, courts must scrutinize both educational
inputs and outcomes over time.59 That assessment of student
56. . See Constitutionality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also
Constitutionality, MERIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/constitutionality (defining constitutionality as “quality or state of
being constitutional, especially: accordance with the provisions of a constitution”)
[https://perma.cc/632B-Q8S9].
57. . McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 249, 251 (Wash. 2012).
58. . See id. at 251.
59. . See, e.g., Gannon v. State, 390 P.3d 461, 488–89 (Kan. 2017) (“To determine
whether the Gannon I test for adequacy is being met through implementation, it is
appropriate to look—as did the panel—to both the financing system’s inputs, e.g., funding,
and outputs, e.g., outcomes such as student achievement.”); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v.
State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 167, 174–75 (S.C. 2014); Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding,
Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 289 (Conn. 2010) (“Measuring educational adequacy
traditionally is accomplished by identifying input and/or output standards that serve as a
measure of adequacy, then calculating the actual cost of attaining those inputs and/or
outputs, a process referred to as ‘costing out.’”); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599
S.E.2d 365, 381 (N.C. 2004); Lake View v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 493 (Ark. 2002);
Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 488 (Wisc. 2000); Carrollton -Farmers Branch Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 529 (Tex. 1992) (“An efficient
school system cannot be achieved through simple control of the inputs to the system (and
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growth and achievement in both absolute and relative terms
informs the court’s judgment about whether fair and meaningful
educational opportunity exists.
For this reason as well, the Washington Supreme Court said
it needed to wait and see whether the new funding formulas
were constitutionally adequate—whether they provided the
requisite opportunity that the state constitution demands. 60
Unfortunately, as these news headlines show, that is not how the
court’s ruling terminating its jurisdiction and lifting its contempt
sanctions was interpreted:
“They did it! Washington has finally fully funded
education”61
“Supreme court rules legislature finally in full compliance
with the McCleary decision”62
“Washington state school funding now legal, high court
rules”63
“Legislature met its duty on public schools, Supreme Court
says”64
It would be easy to dismiss these headlines as uninformed
or sensational but for the fact that the Washington Supreme
Court itself repeatedly characterized the legislature’s actions as
certainly not through control of funding alone) the outputs of the system must be monitored
and measured against a standard and the inputs must then be adjusted to correct any
deficiencies.”); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978);
Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (“Ultimately a well-conceived educational
system requires that educational goals be formulated, that decisions be made as to
what inputs of human and material resources are required, that the resources be properly
allocated among students according to their needs in light of the goals, and finally that the
success of the system in achieving its educational goals be evaluated and, based upon that
evaluation, the choice of educational goals, the decision as to resource needs, and the
process of allocating resources to students be revised.”); Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d
711, 716 (Mich. 1973).
60. . Order of Nov. 15, 2017, supra note 24, at 1.
61. . MYNORTHWEST (Jun. 7, 2018), http://mynorthwest.com/1012718/washingtonfully-funds-education-mccleary/?.
62. . Emily Boerger, WASHINGTON STATE WIRE (Jun. 7, 2018),
https://washingtonstatewire.com/supreme-court-rules-legislature-finally-in-fullcompliance-with-the-mccleary-decision [https://perma.cc/FE9J-ZTPX].
63. .
Rachel
La
Corte,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Jun.
7,
2018),
https://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwestnews/index.ssf/2018/06/washington_state_school_fundin.html
[https://perma.cc/HC2FVFXE].
64. . Jim Camden, THE SPOKESMAN -REVIEW (updated Jun. 8, 2018),
http://www.spokesman.com/
stories/2018/jun/07/legislature-met-its-duty-on-publicschools-supreme/ [https://perma.cc/X3L7-ZPU3].
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being compliant, having adequately or fully funding key
components of the basic education program—again even as the
court was reserving the possibility that the new funding
formulas were not constitutionally adequate:
The “legislature enacted a funding system that, when fully
implemented, will achieve constitutional compliance according
to the benchmarks that have consistently guided judicial
oversight.”65
“The court concludes that the legislature has met the
formulas. . .called for by [statute], and thus it is adequately
funding that component of basic education.”66
“In sum, . . .the State has satisfied the court’s mandate to
fully fund the program of basic education established by
[statute] in accordance with the formulas and benchmarks set
forth in [statute] and this court’s orders.”67
Misperception about the ruling bolstered by the unduly
generous application of the reasonable fit standard not only
distorted the norm and commonly understood meaning of
constitutionality, it also now poses the risk of distorting the
expectations of constitutionality. If educational outcomes do not
improve or only modestly improve in the State of Washington
over the next few years, opponents will point to the protracted
McCleary saga and say it was not worth it, either because
“money doesn’t matter”68 or because courts can’t make a
difference.69 Such criticisms will be based on the mistaken
assumption that Washington had achieved constitutionally
adequate funding in 2018. Yet the influx of $8 billion into the
K-12 education budget must be considered from the perspective
that, prior to McCleary, Washington had to a long way to go to

65. . Order of Nov. 15, 2017, supra note 24, at 1.
66. . Id. at 29.
67. . Id. at 37.
68. . See Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and
the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1469 (2007) (“Insult is added to
the injury being perpetrated on these students by the argument advanced by some critics of
judicial efforts to rectify these inequities that ‘money doesn’t matter’ in overcoming
educational disadvantages.”).
69. . See Derek W. Black, Reforming School Discipline, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 66–
67 (2016) (“States argue that educational outcomes are more directly a product of student
demographic variables and student effort [or,] to the extent money matters, the state has
provided districts with sufficient funds and that the problem is local mismanagement.”).
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reach even average student outcomes, much less constitutionally
adequate outcomes.70
Before the state enacted its new budget, analysis showed
that Washington ranked in the bottom of states with a grade of
“F” due to its low fiscal effort on education spending compared
with its high fiscal capacity. 71 The same analysis showed
Washington ranked near the bottom on teacher wage
competitiveness. 72 And another report determined that, for poor
school districts in the bottom twenty percent to reach average
student outcomes, the State would need to increase funding by
$10,500 per pupil. 73 From that perspective, the $8 billion does
not seem so grand or even adequate.
Beyond the numbers, it matters that courts formulate
constitutionality with care and precision because other courts,
advocates, scholars, and state defendants pay attention to the net
effect of these cases as well as the political costs incurred in the
judicial-legislative showdowns they inevitably set off. Some
state courts are encouraged by the overall outcomes, like the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court which after decades of treating
these cases as nonjusticiable, recently reversed course.74 But
more courts lately are discouraged. Courts in six states have
surrendered entirely, refusing to even to entertain the merits of
these cases which they perceive to entangle them in political

70. . See Derek Black, The Washington Legislature May Have Gotten the Supreme
Court Off Its Back, But Is It Funding Schools Adequately?, EDUCATION LAW P ROF BLOG
(Jun. 8, 2018), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/education_law/2018/06/the-washingtonlegislature-may-have-gotten-the-supreme-court-off-its-back-but-is-it-funding-schools-.html
[https://perma.cc/85DJ-AV4P].
71. . BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT
CARD
7,
(7th
ed.
2018),
http://www.edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/publications/Is_School_Funding_Fair_7th_Ed
iti.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZXB8-UP9C].
72. . Id. at 17.
73. . BRUCE D. BAKER, ET AL., THE REAL SHAME OF THE NATION: THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF INTERSTATE INEQUITY IN PUBLIC SCHOOL INVESTMENTS 49 (2018),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cm6Jkm6ktUT3SQplzDFjJIy3G3iLWOtJ/view
[https://perma.cc/YN6J-69HK].
74. . William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Penn. Dep’t of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 455 (Pa. 2017)
(“These many decisions stand for the proposition that courts in a substantial majority of
American jurisdictions have declined to let the potential difficulty and conflict that may
attend constitutional oversight of education dissuade them from undertaking the task of
judicial review.”).
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questions reserved for the other coordinate branches. 75 Equally
troubling, a majority of courts are on the retreat.76 They either
decline the opportunity to get involved, deny a constitutional
violation despite substantial educational deprivations and
disparities, or find a violation but then decline to specify a
remedy or give any remedial guidance, out of deference to
legislative prerogatives and separation of powers.77 Few courts
are advancing in the battle, by not only finding a constitutional
violation but also specifying a remedy or providing guidance
about remedial measures to cure the violation. 78
The Washington Supreme Court is one of the few that have
remained active, setting a rhythm and pace for others to follow.
The concern raised here is that the court’s use of the reasonable
fit standard—as a politically expedient test for constitutionality
rather than conditional compliance—will ultimately undercut the
judiciary’s role in education rights cases, which will set back the
cause of educational justice.

B. Perverse Presumptions and Burden Shifting
The reasonable fit standard indulges procedural inequities
once the standard is satisfied and the court then terminates its
jurisdiction. At that point, a heavy burden of proof shifts back
to aggrieved-yet-not-fully remediated rightholders, i.e., the
children. Meanwhile, courts will assume the continued good
faith of a repeated-rights-offender dutyholder, i.e., the state, who
otherwise remains insufficiently undeterred. In a number of
jurisdictions, the state is then further entitled to a presumption of
constitutionality. 79 Thereafter, would-be plaintiffs seeking to
75. . See Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 819 (Ala. 2002); Coal. for Adequacy &
Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 406–08 (Fla. 1996); Comm. for
Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1190–93 (Ill. 1996); Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity
& Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 178–80 (Neb. 2007); Okla. Educ. Ass’n v.
State, 158 P.3d 1058, 1066 (Okla. 2007); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 57–
59 (R.I. 1995).
76. . See Weishart, supra note 47, at 348.
77. . See id.
78. . See id.
79. . See Abbott by Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417, 431-32 (N.J. 1997)
(“We do not discount or minimize the State’s contention that. . .a legislative enactment. . .is
entitled to a presumption of validity.”); DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d at 737
(“We are aware that the General Assembly has the responsibility to enact legislation and

2019

RETHINKING CONSTITUTIONALITY

509

prove that the K-12 system remains inadequate or inequitable
must overcome that presumption and reestablish causation,
which can be exceedingly difficult in education rights cases. 80
The rejoinder that plaintiffs typically bear the burden of
proof in the normal course of civil litigation overlooks the
thumb that the reasonable fit standard places on the scales.81 It
is because that standard has been satisfied that plaintiffs remain
unsatisfactorily remediated. At best, plaintiffs have been told
that certain legislative measures may reasonably achieve
constitutional adequacy and equity, not that they do or will.
Under such circumstances, the fairer procedure would be to
presume that the system remains unconstitutional (or
conditionally constitutional), unless and until plaintiffs are fully
remediated. The reasonable fit standard provides no such
failsafe. Rather, it returns the parties procedurally to the status
quo ante with all the attendant presumptions and burdens in the
state’s favor. This is especially problematic when, upon
plaintiffs return to court, constitutionality will again be judged
by the reasonable fit standard: “The presumption of
constitutionality operates to supply the facts necessary to
establish a law’s reasonableness” even when those facts do “not
actually exist”—”all that is necessary is that a rational legislator

that such legislation is presumptively valid. However, this does not mean that we may turn
a deaf ear to any challenge to laws passed by the General Assembly.” (internal citations
omitted)); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State (Abbeville II), 767 S.E.2d 157, 161 (S.C.
2014) (“‘[A]ll statutes are presumed constitutional and, if possible, will be construed to
render them valid.’ Accordingly, we will not find a statute unconstitutional unless ‘its
repugnance to the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt.’”) (alteration in
original) (quoting Curtis v. State, 549 S.E.2d 591, 597 (S.C. 2001))).
The presumption would not typically apply when the challenged law affects a fundamental
right. See, e.g., Yakima Cty. Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n v. Bd. of Comm’rs for Yakima Cty.,
601 P.2d 936, 941 (Wash. 1979) (“[S]tatutes which affect constitutionally protected
fundamental rights. . .do not enjoy such a presumption of constitutionality.”). A number of
state courts, however, have either ruled that education is not a fundamental right or
declined to decide the question. See Weishart, supra note 44, at Tables A–C, 244–54.
80. . See Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher Tenure, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 75, 107, 123-42 (2016) (explanation the difficulties of establishing that
state policy or practice caused educational deprivations).
81. . Cf. Edward C. Dawson, Adjusting the Presumption of Constitutionality Based on
Margin of Statutory Passage, 16 U. P A. J. CONST. L. 97, 113 (2013) (noting contention that
application of strong presumption of constitutionality “would operate as a ‘thumb on the
scale’ and might lead a judge to uphold a statute even if he had a fairly strong belief that it
might be unconstitutional”).
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could have reasonably thought that they exist.”82 Thus, the
reasonable fit standard tips the scales on the backend of the
litigation and on the frontend of successive litigation.
The deference compelled by the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative fact-finding may be entirely
unwarranted in many education rights cases. “Legislatures often
enact legislation without engaging in any fact-finding, and even
when legislatures do conduct fact-finding, the legislative agenda
may drive fact-finding instead of the other way around.”83
Legislatures enacting education budgets and funding formulas
are no exception in that they “typically follow one of two paths:
a majority rules democratic process that tends toward
inequitable results, or a process driven by expert analysis that
tends toward meeting student need. Absent judicial oversight,
the former has been the de facto rule in nearly all states.” 84 And
even when the legislature incorporates experts and “make goodfaith findings of fact,. . .[it] is unlikely to have devoted much
attention to whether the factual circumstances underlying the
legislation satisfy the. . .constitutional tests.”85
Such measures of democratic accountability—another
justification for attaching the presumption of constitutionality—
also seems misplaced in state education rights cases. 86 At
minimum, democratic accountability is less salient for state
court judges, most of whom are “popularly elected and

82. . See F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447, 1453 (2010) (emphasis added).
83. . Id. at 1473–74.
84. . Derek W. Black, Averting Educational Crisis: Funding Cuts, Teacher
Shortages, and the Dwindling Commitment to Public Education, 94 WASH. U.L. REV. 423,
476 (2016); see Montoy v. State, 120 P.3d 306, 310 (Kan. 2005) (per curiam) (“[T]he
financing formula was not based upon actual costs to educate children but was instead
based on former spending levels and political compromise.”); Campaign for Fiscal Equity,
Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 347–48 (N.Y. 2003) (“[T]he political process allocates to
City schools a share of state aid that does not bear a perceptible relation to the needs of
City students.”).
85. . Hessick, supra note 82, at 1474.
86. . See id. at 1469 (noting justification supposes that “[a]ggressive judicial review
undermines this accountability by allowing the policy preferences of the judiciary to
displace the policy preferences of the democratically accountable legislators.. . .Courts
accordingly should restrain themselves from intervening,. . .and allow poor decisions to be
worked out through the democratic process.”).
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retained.”87
Yet even if the democratic accountability
justification were more apt, the U.S. Supreme Court has
explained that the presumption of constitutionality should
restrain courts from intervening in democratic process “absent
some reason to infer antipathy” by the political branches.88
Such antipathy is surely present in many education rights cases
focused on the adequacy and equity of school funding.
State legislatures have chronically underfunded or
defunded public education for decades.89 And then when they
are finally held to give an account, it takes them years to comply
with the court’s orders, as they kick and scream along the way.
Consider the bruising school funding battles in Kansas, where
legislators have tried to strip the court of jurisdiction, threatened
to change the process of judicial selection, and have repeatedly
sought to amend the state constitution to weaken the right to
education. 90 All of this in response to the Kansas Supreme
Court trying to enforce that right rather than retreat as so many
other courts have done. If that does not provide a basis to infer
antipathy, it is hard to imagine what else would besides more
overt and invidious discrimination or animus.
There is certainly no credible argument that the state,
having once satisfied the reasonable fit standard, will be
sufficiently deterred from backsliding on their promise to
achieve and maintain adequate school funding levels. The
Washington Supreme Court acknowledged as much but
shrugged off the concern, saying it was “the nature of the
legislative process.”91 The court also said it “presumes the
legislature will do its job until it demonstrates
otherwise.”92 This is a stunningly obtuse statement considering
the record before the court. Were the preceding decades of
87. . See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1157-58 (1999)
(“Countermajoritarian concerns may not be as uniformly salient in the state constitutional
context, given variations among state court systems—states vary, among other things, in
the way in which judges are recruited, selected, retained, and compensated—but they are
all non-Article III decisionmakers.”).
88. . Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (emphasis added).
89. . See, e.g., Black, supra note 84, at 431–34.
90. . Richard E. Levy, The War of Judicial Independence: Letters from the Kansas
Front, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 725, 725–267 (2017).
91. . Order of Nov. 15, 2017, supra note 24, at 38.
92. . Id. at 39.
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underfunding not sufficient demonstration? How about the
1,365 days that the legislature was in contempt for failing to
comply with the court’s orders? Or the 1,029 days of which that
the legislature incurred $100,000-per-day fines, was that not
sufficient demonstration to avoid the presumption of
constitutionality and good faith compliance?
The balance of the equities simply does not weigh in favor
of burdening not-fully-remediated plaintiffs with overcoming a
presumption of constitutionality while benefiting repeatedrights-offender defendants out of deference to their legislative
acts and facts. Yet that procedural inequity is exactly what the
reasonable fit standard indulges when it inevitably leads courts
to terminate their jurisdiction without any safeguards to deter
future legislative transgressions.

C. Terminating the Interminable
The reasonable fit standard operates on the misguided
belief that constitutionality can be fixed for educational
adequacy and equity such that once the standard is satisfied, the
matter should be terminated. That belief is misguided because
equity and adequacy are comparative, dynamic, and
interminable constitutional ends. To make and judge progress
towards adequacy and equity one necessarily has to compare
“educational resources, opportunities, and outcomes of
similarly-situated and differently-situated children.”93 That task
is plainly comparative when you are trying to make distributions
of educational opportunity more equitable, across school
districts and especially between students with different needs.
But it is also comparative when the object is for all students to
have access to a quality or adequate education, one that will
enable them to meet certain educational outcomes, become full,
equal citizens and productive members of society.
What it takes for a child to become an equal, productive
citizen—where to set that adequacy baseline—invariably turns
on what educational resources and opportunities other children

93. . See Joshua E. Weishart, The Constitutionally Anomalous Right to Education,
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. EDUCATION LAW (Kristine Bowman, ed., Oxford Univ.
Press, forthcoming), http://bit.ly/2JYW1Ta.
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have. 94 Hence, below that baseline distributions aimed at
achieving adequacy must be comparative. Moreover, at a
certain point large-scale disparities between children just at the
adequacy baseline and those high above it will begin to
undermine the ability of all children to function as equals and
compete on fair terms for higher education and high-quality
jobs. 95 One must then make a comparative assessment to correct
those disparities, which might require recalibrating and raising
the adequacy baseline to diminish certain positional advantages
held above it.96
Adequacy and equity thus cannot be static concepts, they
must be dynamic – evolving to meet the educational needs of an
ever-changing society. 97
A number of courts have so
concluded, 98
including notably the Washington Supreme
Court.99 Thus, as Derek Black has explained, the temporal
94. . See Weishart, supra note 44, at 240.
95. . Id. at 292.
96. . Id.
97. . Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 171 (1995) (observing that courts have recognized that
questions of educational adequacy “must change with evolving social and economic
conditions and with changing societal expectations about the role of the schools. The
standard of adequacy cannot be static.”).
98. . Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 255 (Conn.
2010) (“The broad constitutional standard also reflects our recognition of the fact that the
specific educational inputs or instrumentalities suitable to achieve this minimum level of
education may well change over time.”); Montoy v. State, 120 P.3d 306, 309 (Kan. 2005)
(“The Kansas Constitution thus imposes a mandate that our educational system cannot be
static or regressive but must be one which ‘advance[s] to a better quality or state.’”);
DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1001 (Ohio 2000) (“The definition of ‘thorough and
efficient’ is not static; it depends on one’s frame of reference. What was deemed thorough
and efficient when the state’s Constitution was adopted certainly would not be considered
thorough and efficient today. Likewise, an educational system that was considered
thorough and efficient twenty-five years ago may not be so today.”); Claremont Sch. Dist.
v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) (“A constitutionally adequate public
education is not a static concept removed from the demands of an evolving world.”);
Campbell Cty. School District v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1274 (Wyo. 1995) (“The definition
of a proper education is not static and necessarily will change.”); McDuffy v. Sec’y of
Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass. 1993) (“The content of the duty to
educate which the Constitution places on the Commonwealth necessarily will evolve
together with our society.”); Abbott by Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 367 (N.J. 1990)
(“[A] thorough and efficient education consists of is a continually changing concept.”);
Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129, 133 (N.J. 1976) (recognizing education as “constantly
evolving” and “that what seems sufficient today may be proved inadequate tomorrow”).
99. . McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 251 (Wash. 2012) (“The legislature has an
obligation to review the basic education program as the needs of students and the demands
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framing that is inherent in litigation is a poor fit for the
constitutional duty to deliver an adequate and equitable
education, which cannot occur at a finite moment in time
because “education is an ongoing project that requires constant
vigilance—the failure [or success] of which can span over years
and decades.”100
As a result of adequacy and equity being both comparative
and dynamic, they are also interminable demands meaning that
these guarantees are unending and cannot be permanently
fulfilled once and for all time. That might strike some as a
daunting if not hopeless proposition, but it should have just the
opposite effect: it should embolden and inspire. One reason it
may not is because we are predisposed to thinking of
constitutionality as a quality, state of being, or condition that can
and should be permanently fixed and, when infringed, promptly
and completely rectified. We know the reality, however, is that
violations of constitutional rights often go unremedied due to
un- or under-enforcement by all three branches. 101 Still, some
might grimace at the thought of striving in vain towards
constitutional guarantees with no conceivable end in sight. That
these guarantees are aspirational, however, does not make them
discretionary and unenforceable, 102 and the project is only in
vain if we fail to make consistent and sustainable progress.
of society evolve.”); McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 555 (“Our Constitution, and its education
clause, must be interpreted ‘in accordance with the demands of modern society or it will be
in constant danger of becoming atrophied and, in fact, may even lose its original
meaning.’”).
100. . See Black, supra note 84, at 469.
101. . See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978); Barry
Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 735 (1992); see also Black, supra note 84, at 464–66 (projecting some of “serious
consequences” to current underenforcement of “education rights and duties” in state
courts).
102. . Several state courts—the Washington Supreme Court being among the first—
have rejected the argument that the education or equality provisions in state constitutions
are purely hortatory or merely aspirational goals committed to the discretion of the
legislature. See, e.g., William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Penn. Dep’t of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 450
(Pa. 2017); Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1223 (Kan. 2014); Rell, 990 A.2d at 261;
Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 394 (Vt. 1997); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State,
655 N.E.2d 661, 665 (N.Y. 1995); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1378
(N.H. 1993); McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 524–28; Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769
P.2d 684, 689 (Mont. 1989); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 85 (Wash.
1978).
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That, I submit, is the better way to think of constitutionality in
education rights cases.

III. FIDELITY TO EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY
AND EQUITY
As a test for constitutionality rather than conditional
compliance, the reasonable fit standard seemingly forces a
binary decision once it is satisfied requiring the court then to
either terminate its jurisdiction or maintain its jurisdiction
indefinitely. That is precisely how justices on the Kansas
Supreme Court viewed their options in Montoy, the precursor to
the current, nearly decade-long Gannon litigation.103 The
Montoy court elected to terminate jurisdiction after it concluded
that the legislature enacted a school funding formula that
substantially complied with the state constitution.104 The court
reasoned that dismissal would avoid further protracted litigation,
observing that other states struggled with developing a plan that
would meet their highest state courts’ approval following
remand to a trial court for further proceedings.105 The court also
noted that it would potentially take up to three years to
appreciate “the full financial impact” of the new formula—”a
factor which would be important in any consideration of
whether it provides constitutionally suitable funding.” 106 In
short, because the newly-enacted school funding formula
essentially passed a reasonable fit standard, the court was
inclined to terminate the matter and wait and see if it would
actually achieve constitutionality.
Justice Rosen concurred in the judgment of dismissal,
warning that the case could “continue in perpetuity” and “extend
into an indefinite future,” if a court had to continually assess
constitutionality, for instance, whenever a different education
model for adequacy were adopted or new adequacy cost study

103. . See John Robb, et al., The Current State of School Finance in Kansas: The
Kansas Legislature’s Occasional Negative Approach to Its Positive Constitutional Duty, 27
KAN. J. L. & PUB. P OL’Y 329, 334–41 (2018) (recounting history of school funding
litigation in Kansas including Montoy and Gannon).
104. . Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755, 765 (Kan. 2006) (per curiam).
105. . Id. at 765–66.
106. . Id. at 766.
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were performed. 107 Justice Rosen contended that the court itself
had shifted in its own adoptions of different educational
models. 108 Taking exception to this “moving target” for
constitutionality, Justice Rosen concluded, “the children of
Kansas need a resolution of this matter now” convinced as he
was that the legislature has substantially complied with this
court’s prior orders.109
Dissenting in part, Justice Beier insisted that the issue of
constitutionality “remains squarely presented” noting the court
had “consistently and correctly equated compliance with [its]
directives to adherence to the legislature’s constitutional
mandate.”110 Hence, unless and until there was full “compliance
with [the court’s] directives,” the legislature could not be said to
have “corrected the constitutional deficiencies in the school
finance design.”111 Justice Beier suggested that only with the
benefit of further evidence of the state’s record on adequacy and
equity could the court say that it had reached the condition of
being in accordance with the constitution. 112 Justice Beier
would have thus retained jurisdiction and remanded to the trial
court “for further proceedings focused on the constitutionality of
the finance system.”113
Post-Montoy, the legislature failed to make good on its
promises: “Between 2009 and 2011, [it] cut funding to education
by over $500 million annually.” 114 The Montoy plaintiffs moved
to reopen their appeal for further proceedings in the trial court,
but the Kansas Supreme Court denied that motion, which led to
the filing of the Gannon litigation in 2010 that is still ongoing.115
With the benefit of hindsight, both Justices Beier and Rosen
were correct in their respective concurrence in and dissent from
the court’s 2006 decision.
If constitutionality is to be
understood as a quality, state, or condition of being in
accordance with the constitution at particular moments in time,
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

. Id. at 769 (Rosen, J., concurring).
. Id.
. Montoy, 138 P.3d at 769.
. Id. at 770 (Beier, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. Robb, et al., supra note 103, at 338.
. Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1206 (Kan. 2014).
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then Justice Rosen was surely correct that adequacy and equity
are moving targets that would call for continual assessments,
perhaps year after year, and certainly with each newly adopted
education model or cost study estimates. Likewise, Justice
Beier was surely correct that if we equate constitutionality with
full compliance with the constitution, then constitutionality will
remain squarely presented until the adequacy and equity
guarantees are permanently fulfilled.
The question this dilemma provokes is not about Justice
Rosen’s and Beier’s adherence to this traditional notion of
constitutionality, but their allegiance to it. Imagine if we could
transcend this notion of constitutionality as being fixed and
tethered to the strictures of the litigation process and judicial
procedure. What if, instead, we thought of constitutionality in
education rights cases as demonstrable and durable fidelity to
the constitution? Not a state of being in accordance with the
constitution, time-stamped 2019, but enduring faithfulness to its
provisions, through steady, verifiable progress towards its
guarantees. That fidelity is compelled by the very nature of the
constitutional guarantees in education rights cases—
interminable demands of adequacy and equity. “Fidelity,” then
as such, “is not a virtue but a precondition. It’s not just a good
thing, but the point of the practice of constitutional
interpretation.”116 And yet fidelity is itself conditioned on a
constitution that serves “as an approximation of what it says it
is, and that requires at least some evidence of progress toward its
ends.”117
In the brief space remaining, I will sketch what rethinking
constitutionality in this vein could entail in education rights
cases.
Demonstrable and durable fidelity to the constitution would
neither force a court to terminate the case nor retain jurisdiction
in perpetuity. Rather, a court could suspend the case and
116. . J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 1705 (1997).
117. . Sotirios A. Barber, Welfare and the Instrumental Constitution, 42 AM. J. JURIS.
159, 186 (1997); see also Sotirios A. Barber, Fidelity and Constitutional Aspirations, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1757 (1997) (“Fidelity to an aspirational constitution requires that we
confront and overcome the imperfections in ourselves that the Constitution presupposes,
including even provisions of the constitutional document that might obstruct progress
toward constitutional ends.”).
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remand to a special master or a trial court to exercise jurisdiction
periodically. At each specified interval, the trial court or special
master would make factual findings and render legal conclusions
regarding the state’s fidelity to educational adequacy and equity.
Again, I have proposed standards for that assessment and for
legislative and judicial remedies that are better suited for that
review than the reasonable fit standard. 118 Either way, with the
reasonable fit standard or another standard, the trial court judge
or special master would review the state’s progress towards
improving educational adequacy and equity.
Between each interval of periodic jurisdiction, the court
should entertain interim remedies. The concept of provisional,
interim remedies is nothing new in education rights cases—they
are typically prompted when “the legislature does nothing or
issues a wholly inadequate response” to the high court’s
order.119 The New Jersey Supreme Court, as active as its
counterparts in Kansas and Washington, provides an example of
the most extensive forms of such interim relief, at one point
ordering “‘parity funding’, resourcing the [poor, urban] Abbott
districts at the average level of an identified set of rich, suburban
districts.”120
But the interim remedies need not be so
demanding. Indeed, two narrow remedies could potentially
prove far more sustainable to the success of the long-term
project for educational justice: data collection and public
engagement projects.
In terms of data collection, courts should require states to
adopt “knowledge production” plans for adequacy and equity. 121
Researchers need to be able to track educational outcomes and
experiences over time to confirm or revise adequacy cost
estimates and also have access to data sets so that they can
118. . See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
119. . See Christopher S. Elmendorf, From Educational Adequacy to
Representational Adequacy: A New Template for Legal Attacks on Partisan Gerrymanders,
59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 1642–43 (2018) .
120. . Id. at 1644; see also David G. Sciarra, Enhancing Court Capacity to Enforce
Education Rights: Judicial Tools Used in Abbot v. Burke, FOUND. FOR LAW, JUSTICE &
SOC’Y
(2009),
http://www.edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/publications/JudicialToolsUsedInAbbottvBur
ke.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W8H-AWQE].
121. . See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Darien Shanske, Solving “Problems No One
Has Solved”: Courts, Causal Inference, and the Right to Education, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV.
693, 734–35, 738–44 (2018).
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control for other variables that might affect causal inferences. 122
State limitations on data collection hinder “the production of
[this] constitutionally significant knowledge.”123 In addition,
researchers and education policymakers need to develop more
reliable ways for identifying and categorizing the needs of
students for weighted student funding purposes and other equity
measures. 124
Courts should also facilitate public engagement with the
process of ensuring fidelity to educational adequacy and
equity.125 Public engagement is vital to the ultimate success of
an education rights case, which can be as dependent on public
support as it is on an enforceable and effective remedy.
School finance litigation often includes a long process of
back and forth between the courts and the legislature in which
the court orders the legislature to refashion its unconstitutional
school finance formula, the legislature acts, and then the court
responds as to whether the revised formula passes constitutional
muster. The court does not tell the legislature how to make
change; the legislature is where the actual change must occur,
and the court is the final arbiter of whether the change is
sufficient.
This characteristic of school finance litigation reinforces
the necessity for public engagement because without the shifting
of political balance in the form of the support of the broader
public, court orders requiring legislative action are not
implemented or sustained.126

122. . See id. .
123. . Id at 697.
124. . See generally id.; see also Betty Malen, et al., The Challenges of Advancing
Fiscal Equity in a Resource-Strained Context, 31 EDUC. POL’Y 615, 618–19 (2017); Helen
F. Ladd, Reflections on Equity, Adequacy, and Weighted Student Funding, 3 EDUC. FIN. &
POL’Y 402, 411–12, 417–19 (2008).
125. . See Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Efficacy and Engagement: The
Remedies Problem Posed by Sheff v. O’Neill—and A Proposed Solution, 29 CONN. L.
REV. 1115, 1153 (1997). See generally PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT FOR P UBLIC EDUCATION :
JOINING FORCES TO REVITALIZE DEMOCRACY AND EQUALIZE SCHOOLS (Marion Orr &
John Rogers, eds. 2011).
126. . Amanda R. Broun & Wendy D. Puriefoy, Public Engagement in School
Reform: Building Public Responsibility for Public Education, 4 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV.
LIBERTIES 217, 241–42 (2008). See generally Jonathan R. Werner, No Knight in Shining
Armor: Why Courts Alone, Absent Public Engagement, Could Not Achieve Successful
Public School Finance Reform in West Virginia, 35 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 61 (2002);
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Courts should therefore conscript the parties, through
mediation or court direction, to consider the whole spectrum of
public engagement possibilities, including organizing coalitions
of teachers, parents, and business and community leaders;
forming panels of professional educators for cost studies;
convening focus groups or town halls to elicit broad-based
public
education;
discussion;
and
involvement
in
implementation of the state’s remedial scheme. 127
With the benefit of the data collected and public input, the
trial court or special master will review the state’s progress
towards improving adequacy and equity. For reasons previously
explained, that review should proceed without the state
benefitting from any presumption of constitutionality. Yet, at
the same time, the plaintiffs should still bear the burden of
proof—to show that there has been insufficient progress towards
educational adequacy and equity, that the funding formulas are
no longer reasonably calculated to achieve adequacy, or that the
margin between adequacy and equity is disproportionate. 128 The
parties will have an opportunity for expedited appellate review
of the judgment of the trial court or special master.
If the courts conclude that the state is no longer in
compliance, then of course the state should be ordered to cure
the violations. Should the courts determine that the state
remains in conditional compliance, however, the process repeats
itself, although a longer interval would then be justified —
perhaps four years instead of two, and then, as the state
continues to demonstrate its good faith compliance, six years
instead of four. The state can accelerate the end of the court
exercising periodic jurisdiction by instutionalizing the interim
remedies or adopting other prophylactic remedies to ward of
legislative relapses. Arkansas, for instance, has institutionalized
Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational Reform in
Kentucky, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 485 (1999).
127. . Cf. Molly Townes O’Brien, At the Intersection of Public Policy and Private
Process: Court-Ordered Mediation and the Remedial Process in School Funding
Litigation, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 391, 433 (2003) (“Involving a broad range of
interested constituencies in an effort to resolve school finance issues simply makes sense.
Consensus building processes have been used successfully in a wide range of school
disputes. Further, the kind of wide-ranging reform required in a school finance case may
not be possible to implement without broad-based public support.”).
128. . See Weishart, supra note 44, at 292.
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one such remedy: by law, the State is required to perform an
adequacy cost study every two years.129
If there is a sustained period of reasonable progress and
fidelity to the constitutional guarantees of adequacy and equity,
then the court should terminate its jurisdiction. At that point,
any new, subsequent challenge would have to proceed through
the normal course of civil litigation, with any attendant
presumptions and burdens that typically redound in the state’s
favor.
Justiciability presents no barrier to the court’s exercise of
periodic jurisdiction.
As an initial matter, state courts
effectuating state constitutional affirmative rights are not
constrained by federal justiciability doctrines calibrated for
Article III constitutional and prudential limitations.130 Standing,
for instance, has not been a significant hurdle. Even when
children from other school districts are not parties to the case,
courts have broadened standing and evidentiary parameters
because the case presents issues “of significant, if not,
paramount, public interests (school-aged children’s rights
concerning public education).”131 And, as explained, even when
the reasonable fit standard is satisfied in these cases, the
plaintiffs remain not fully remediated, so a constitutional injury
persists and, thus, so does standing and ripeness, at least until
there is demonstrable and durable fidelity with the constitutional

129. . ARK. CODE ANN. § 10-3-2102(a)(8), (j)(2) (2012).
130. . See generally Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The
Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999); Helen Hershkoff,
State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1833 (2001).
131. . See Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 376–77 (N.C. 2004) (“If
inordinate numbers of [children] are wrongfully being denied their constitutional right to
the opportunity for a sound basic education, our state courts cannot risk further and
continued damage because the perfect civil action has proved elusive.”); Idaho Sch. for
Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 129 P.3d 1199, 1203 (Idaho 2005) (“[A] judgment that
[school] funding mechanism is unconstitutional will necessarily affect all school districts
throughout the state, regardless of whether those districts presented evidence at trial,
previously settled, or were never parties to this lawsuit.”); Rose v. Council for Better
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 202 (Ky. 1989) (“If a statute (or in this case, a system
established by statutes) is not constitutionally valid, the existence or non-existence of a
class of litigants is immaterial.”); see also Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71,
80-83 (N.J. 1978); but see Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1042–43 (N.J.
2011) (“Simply stated, the present Abbott plaintiffs do not have standing. . .to seek
vindication of the rights of children outside of the plaintiff class.”).
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guarantees. Separation of powers and political questions do not
so much present textual obstacles, 132 but they do force an
underlying issue in education rights cases, namely, the proper
role of state courts in determining constitutionality. That brings
us back full circle to McCleary.
Justice Johnson dissented from the court’s original 2012
decision and subsequent order retaining jurisdiction and
requiring the state to report periodically on implementation. He
argued that those actions breached separation of powers because
the court did not “have enough information to know whether the
legislature’s outlined progress is adequate” in light of “financial
constraints and plans for future budgets” and because “the state
of educational opportunities in various areas is everchanging.”133 Therefore, the court was simply “unqualified to
assess the progress made or the legislature’s chances of
achieving” constitutionally adequate school funding.134 But here
Justice Johnson perhaps makes the best case for the court
exercising periodic jurisdiction, rather than terminating the
case—so that the court will be well-informed and wellpositioned to assess the state’s fidelity with the constitutional
guarantees of educational adequacy and equity—that is, to
assess constitutionality.

IV. CONCLUSION
The perception that courts keep spinning their wheels in
education rights cases is party driven by the glaring spotlight
over a politically expedient finish line that never should have
been marked there in the first place. Believing there is such a
destination, an attainable, fixed point of constitutional
132. . See Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of
Educational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L.
REV. 701, 745 (2010) (“[T]he explicitness of separation of powers doctrine in the
constitutional text—does not have any discernable impact on whether courts choose to
abstain from the merits of constitutional litigation on the very grounds of separation of
powers.”); David G. Hinojosa, “Race-Conscious” School Finance Litigation: Is A Fourth
Wave Emerging?, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 869, 882, 882 n.70 (2016) (noting very few courts
have dismissed cases as nonjusticiable on grounds that there is “a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department”).
133. . Dissent to Order by Justice James M. Johnson at 4, 5, 8, McCleary v. State,
269 P.3d 227 (Wash. 2012) (No. 84362-7).
134. . Id. at 8.
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compliance, merely dooms courts and legislatures to failure in
these cases. Rather than judge whether the state has crossed an
arbitrary line of probabilistic, temporary compliance, courts
should judge whether the state is actually heading in the right
direction with all children on board, improving adequacy and
equity.
To say that judging progress towards these
constitutional guarantees is not the role of courts is to consign
the judiciary to task of waving the flag—ostensibly checkered
but really white. If we are truly committed to educational
adequacy and equity, we can and should expect courts to stay
the course, preoccupied not with judging an end but the distance
from the beginning, until are all satisfied that the state has kept
faith with the constitution.

